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Involving Others:
Towards an Ethical Concept of Risk*
Christoph Rehmann-Sutter**
Introduction
Which concepts do we have in mind when we are describing the
dangerous side of technology or ecological perils? I want to reflect on
those concepts we have in mind when we use the word "risk". These
concepts can be used to describe practical situations involving
technology and are crucial for their moral assessment. The finding that
I present is that there are at least two basic concepts of risk, rather than
one. This paper is an essay combining risk assessment procedures with
the perspective of an "ethic of care."
Risk assessment is currently dominated by a basic risk paradigm
adapted from economics, which I call the "economic" concept of risk.
That concept has dominated the academic discussion of risk assessment
since the work of Chauncey Starr in the sixties.1 I call the alternative
basic concept of risk the "juridical" concept, from its origin in the
judicial theories of responsibility and liability. Though it has been left
out of the academic discussion of risk assessment, it would be helpful
for an ethical approach: It might connect the ethical discussion with the
experiences of persons who find themselves (or others they are related
to) affected by technico-ecological risk. There is considerable
discrepancy between their perception of risk, which often is an
* A shorter version of this paper was read at the Biennial International Meeting of
the Risk Assessment & Policy Association (RAPA) March 6-7, 1997 in Alexandria,
VA. My work was supported by a grant from the Stiftung Mensch-Gesellschaft-
Umwelt (MGU) at the University of Basel. I thank anonymous referees and my
colleagues Andres Klein, Hansj6rg Seiler and Adrian Vatter for fruitful discussions
and Jackie Leach Scully for improving the clarity of the text.
Dr. Rehmann-Sutter is lecturer of Philosophy of Nature and Bioethics on the
Faculty of Natural Sciences of the University of Basel, Switzerland. He received his
Diploma (Molecular Biology) from the University of Basel, Biocenter, M.S. degrees
(Philosophy and Sociology) from the Universities of Basel and Freiburg i. Brsg., and
his Ph.D. from Technische Hochschule Darmstadt.
1 See e.g., Chauncey Starr, Social Benefits Versus Technological Risk, 156
Science 1237 (1969).
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experience of injustice, and the conceptualization of the issue by risk
assessors who see risks as variables connected to the options of a choice.
The juridical risk concept seems better suited for the ethical analysis
of the situations generated by the use of risky technology. 'While the
economic risk concept diverts attention away from those affected, the
juridical risk concept includes those affected as real partners in a
complex network of moral relationships. Moreover it has the heuristic
advantage to lead ethical analysis into concrete complexities of real
situations.
When I speak of "risk concepts," I am not reflecting upon different
meanings of the word risk, but rather the way risk defines a situation.
My basic questions are: What structure is given to the initially chaotic
circumstances? How do we transform the practical reality into an issue
which can be debated in risk assessment? What kind of problem do we
realize? These are basic questions deserving some philosophical scrutiny.
There is such a transformation and we disagree about it. Often, those
physically affected by the burdens and harms think differently from
those making decisions and consequently use different descriptions of
the situation. Ethical analysis is practically implicated in the processes of
forming the world we live in. Using a particular conceptualization of the
practical situation when beginning ethical deliberation can have
momentous effects on our moral choices.
In sum, the standard economic concept of risk is biased. It
systematically hides those affected and contributes to the political
exclusion of them, or in the case of future generations, their
representatives, and of other living beings in nature.
The Economic Concept of Risk
Introductory texts of risk assessment usually present, as the "basic
risk paradigm," a variant of the following well-known picture (where
(A, B = options; and X, G, L = outcomes):2
2 From F. Wharton, Risk Management: Basic Concepts and General Principles,
Risk--Analysis, Assessment and Management 1-14 (J. Ansell & F. Wharton, eds.
1992); see also N. Rescher, Risk. A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk
Evaluation and Management (1983).
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Figure 1







The situation in which a risk occurs is defined as that in which a
decision must be made between at least two different options, A and B,
each with distinct outcomes, X, G and L. Some outcomes depend on
unpredictable events and have correlated probabilities. The outcomes
are described as possible gains and possible losses. The fundamental
structure of the problem is an optimization with reference to a certain
value scale: minimization of damage or maximization of utility. The
behavior at issue is represented as walking along a decision tree.
The classical exposition of this concept is found in Frank Knight's
book where he defined the term risk as "measurable uncertainties."
3
The criterion of calculability is the most important feature of the
economic account of risk. A broad scientific literature has subsequently
developed. Sophisticated methods for "rational" decision-making in
situations of uncertainty have been worked out; the fields of game and
decision theory have been established. When the harmful side effects of
technology entered public and scientific discussions, it seemed obvious
that this economic concept could also be applied to the novel topics of
ecology and technology assessment. Additionally, the ethical problem
of coping with risky technology was correspondingly seen as a question
of acceptability, in the sense of what amount of risk would be
acceptable to those affected, or what level of additional, humanly-
derived risk would be small enough to be considered negligible.
Of course, this approach has also provoked much criticism, among
the most prominent of which was formulated by Kristin Shrader-
Frechette. 4 The criticisms by Shrader-Frechette and others reflect the
unease we feel when we are using a concept which was elaborated for
3 See Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921).
4 See Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality (1991).
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optimization of entrepreneurial behavior in an unpredictable market, to
describe technological interventions into the physical world with
physical consequences to other persons and living ecosystems which
may reduce or even eliminate the probability of their survival. What is
rational in the first context might not be rational in the second.
The disadvantage of the economic concept in an ethical analysis of
technico-ecological risks is the following. In the economic concept there
is only one personal position: the decision-maker. We have difficulty in
adequately including those other persons physically affected by the
consequences of the decision. Often, they themselves have to fight to be
included in the decision-making process, where the concept of risk is
worked out in reality. These other participants are abstract; attention is
diverted away from them. These participants are conceptually hidden.
The Juridical Concept of Risk
Legal philosophy, especially the theory of causation and liability in
law, has developed another concept of risk. The literature is nearly as
old as that of the economic. References to W. Seavey, the protagonist
of risk theory in the law of torts in the thirties, 5 can be found in the
well-known book of H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honor6, Causation in the
Law.6 The context for this juridical risk theory is the relationship of
responsibility for harms for which the action of some person was a
condition sine qua non. In this context, there is a need to differentiate
between cases where a condition necessary for the emergence of some
harm can be seen as the "cause" for that harm, and other cases where it
cannot. The courts generally do not hold someone guilty and liable for
a harm to another person on the sole ground that his or her behavior
was a necessary condition for it. If for example a letter bomb is brought
by a postman, this action of the postman may be a condition sine qua
non for the damage to the receiver, but the postman is not seen as
guilty or liable for it. In other cases the necessary condition is enough
for establishing a relationship of responsibility or at least of co-
responsibility. If an employee failed to lock the door through which a
thief entered, they might perhaps be seen as liable for negligence. The
5 See W. Seavey, Princples of Torts, 56 Harv.L.Rev. 72 (1942-43).
6 See H.L.A. Hart & Tony HonorS, Causation in the Law (2d, 1985)(citing
Seavey, supra note 5).
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risk theory of responsibility tries to resolve the problem of demarcation
by establishing that in one sort of case the harm is within the risk of a
certain behavior and in the other sort the harm is not within the risk of
the behavior. We can attempt to illustrate the concept in an analogous
form (where A = responsible person; B = affected person; and C =
intervening person):
Figure 2





I "within the risk" of A
conditions
When we say (taking the simple example) that the invasion of a
thief is "within the risk" of failing to lock the door, we are describing a
relationship of responsibility between three persons. Two of them are
actors that share responsibility: the thief (A), and that person who failed
to take ordinary precautions, (C). A third person, (B), is harmed. From
the perspective of the person (C) who is obliged to take precautions, the
actions of the thief (A) are mere conditions necessary for an event
resulting in a harm. Their responsibility is directed towards those
affected by the outcomes of an uncertain event.
That picture can be read in two directions. Seen ex post facto, the
person affected (B) appears as complainant and the first actors (A & C)
as defendants. The issue is whether one or both of them are guilty and
thus liable or not. Seen ex ante facto the first actor (A or C) is in the
center of the analysis and there are known or unknown others who may
be affected by the consequences of the actions. The question in this
perspective can be one of moral responsibility towards those affected.
The concept was developed originally in an ex post facto perspective in
the legal literature. I propose here to introduce it to the ex ante facto
perspective in the ethical discussion of technico-ecological risks.
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The main advantage is the following. In the juridical concept there
are two main personal positions, the defendant and the complainant.
This concept describes a relationship of causation and liability, and
leads to a perception of moral responsibility toward concrete others as
affected persons.
Some Arguments Against the "Risk Thesis"
(i) Hart and Honor6 convincingly criticize the "risk theory" within a
view ex post facto. They assert that liability should not generally be
restricted to harm that was foreseeable at the moment of the action,
because this principle would unduly prevent recovery for "ulterior
harm."7 There are types of situations of negligence where courts held
defendants liable for unforeseeable harm and where such an imposition
of liability seemed just. They cite (among others) Vandenburgh v.
Truax, 8 where the "defendant frightened a boy (thereby committing
an intentional assault) who, in his panic, ran into plaintiff s shop and
overturned a cask of wine. For the loss of the wine defendant was held
liable, though he did not intend it," although it is questionable whether
it was in fact foreseeable by him or not.9 Liability for harms resulting
from an intentionally harmful behavior is sometimes not restricted to
those harms the wrongdoer could foresee at the time of his
wrongdoing. In other words, even for those harms not lying "within the
risk" of a behavior one can be held liable if other conditions are present,
such as the harmful intent of the actor. But in the opposite view, ex
ante facto, when responsibility in its ethical sense rather than liability is
the relevant category, this objection to the risk theory disappears. For
epistemological reasons we cannot be responsible for consequences we
are not able to foresee, and such unforeseeable effects cannot be a part
of the action.
But it is important to realize that the range of foreseeability can be
expanded by that type of research we call "risk assessment." There are
situations where we have good reason to assume that our knowledge
about the consequences of a certain act is insufficient. In such situations,
7 Id.
8 Vandenburgh v. Truax, 4 Denio NY 464 (1847).
9 Hart & HonorS, supra note 6, at 259
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responsibility cannot be restricted to those consequences we actually can
foresee (in a certain state of knowledge) but must include those we
could foresee if we would only make enough effort to reveal their
potential.
(ii) It is questionable whether liability should include all foreseeable
harm, or instead, only such harm not resulting from a combination of
the action in question and "the subsequent intervention of a free
voluntary act or of an abnormal or coincidental event." 10 In the view
ex ante facto, I can see no reason for an a priori exclusion of harms
resulting from an action and a second event, if its possibility or even its
likelihood can be anticipated. There is, for example, an ethical
responsibility to include the harm that could result from a criminal
attack on an atomic power plant, even if this harm results from a
subsequent intervention of a free and voluntary act that could cancel the
juridical liability of those planning the power plant expost facto.
The reasoning in liability issues ex post is not identical to the
reasoning in responsibility issues ex ante. Therefore, the risk doctrine
in the described version, as responsibility for foreseeable harm, can
survive those objections. Hart and Honore, however, discussed the
doctrine in its liability version. 11
(iii) An argument intended to restrict the "risk thesis" in the theory
of moral rights was brought forward by Judith Jarvis Thomson. 12 She
includes the perspective ex ante in the discussion of the hypothetical
case of A, who is clearing his land, which abuts the highway. A does not
care where he is throwing the logs he cuts from his trees and in fact
throws one of them into the highway. B is a person who comes along
later, but luckily sees the log in time, does not trip over it, and does not
break an arm, although this (or another harm) could have happened to
her. Thomson's question is: Does A infringe a claim of B's? This
question could be answered positively by the reason that imposing on B
only a probability of harm is causing a disadvantage to B. Causing a
disadvantage may be itself causing the person a harm, and therefore, A
is infringing a claim of B's. But this is, as Thomson argues, "a bad
10 Id. at 275.
11 See generally, Hart & Honor6, supra note 6 (This point certainly needs further
discussion).
12 Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights 242 (1990).
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argument," for we cannot allege "that causing a person to be at a
disadvantage is itself causing the person a harm." 13 A harm would be
actually breaking an arm, but not probably breaking an arm. We feel
that A did infringe a claim of B's, but not because we have claims
against each other that they not impose risks of harm on us, but because
of the "fact that throwing the logs one clears off one's land into the
public highway is illegal."1 4 One of the main reasons for making log
throwing on highways generally illegal is that by allowing such behavior,
the risk to the rest of us would dramatically increase.
In my view also, the singular act of imposing a risk to known or
unknown others can be seen as infringing on a moral right of theirs. I
admit that there is an apparent difference between actually being
harmed and being exposed to a risk of harm (who could seriously try to
deny it?), but a probability of harm still leads to a change in the
situation of those affected The situation where a certain (set of) harm(s)
are probable is simply a worse place to be. Morally, this should count.
So, the known and unknown others affected by my risk-imposing
behavior are affected considerably and for the worse by imposing risk
on them. A ought not to bring B into a dangerous situation. This would
be true even if no legal rule existed that addresses the case, and
therefore, A did nothing illegal. 15
Constructing a Situation
Let me illustrate with two examples drawn from real cases. One is
low-technological-private and the other high-technological-public. I will
compare how one and the same circumstances can be described as two
different situations of risk by the two risk concepts.
(A) A family decides to cross a small lake with their row boat. They
are deliberating whether their two children, who cannot swim, should
put on their life jackets or not. The weather is sunny and the wind light;
the children hate putting on stiff life jackets. There are motorboats
racing around. According to the economic risk concept the situation
13 Id. at 244.
14 Id. at 247.
15 And there is no need to seek refuge in a shaky ad hoc theory of "objective
oughts" in the case that no legal or moral fault is made, id. at 241, 246. Even without
infringing a law or an accepted moral rule, bringing others into a dangerous situation
is directly infringing a personal claim of theirs.
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can be described as a situation of a choice between the options of
putting on versus not putting on the jackets. The consequences of
putting on the life jackets are a decrease in the probability of two
human deaths during the lake crossing, some annoyance of the kids and
some irritation of the responsible parents. The consequences of
disregarding the life jackets are an increase in the probability of two
human deaths, and the avoidance of annoyance and irritation. This
choice has a first moral dimension in the determination of the relative
weights of the probabilities, harms and gains. Additionally, there is a
second moral dimension: the acceptability of that (small) probability
that the rowing boat might be rammed by a motorboat and the
children might not be saved in either way. The only way to determine
whether this would be acceptable or not is to compare that likelihood
with other likelihoods such as already accepted risks or natural dangers.
According to the juridical risk concept, the first question would be:
What is within the risk of not putting on the life jackets? That leads our
thinking in a quite different direction. What could we do to avoid
harm to those we take care of? Which precautionary measures are due?
Can it be considered responsible behavior towards the possibly affected
children, not to put on life jackets for the only reason that it is
troublesome? Would we, if we were the parents, be considered guilty or
not, if a motorboat capsizes our boat and one or both of the children
drowns? Would we, as parents, hold ourselves guilty or not guilty in a
moral sense?
(B) As a second example let us choose the transport of highly
radioactive waste to an interim disposal site. 16 According to the
economic risk concept the transport could be seen as acceptable, if it
does not increase the probability of a serious accident and the
consequent release of radioactivity above a certain value. According to
the juridical risk concept the question would again be: What lies within
the risk of such transport? Acts of sabotage, criminals who could exploit
the situation, accidents nobody could anticipate, concatenations of
16 One such incident took place in Germany 02/28-03/0511997 just at a time I
delivered this paper: the third transport of Castor containers to the old salt mine of
Gorleben. The protests of environmental activists were strong and led to brawls with
the police. Some 500 persons were injured, but the storage of the containers could not
be prevented (Qf the relevant newspaper reports).
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improbable coincidences, a further stabilization and fostering of the
atomic industry and of a lethal system of energy production that
threatens the life and health of not only the present but of future
generations? The action is now seen as one element of a causal network,
not as the result of an isolated decision.
"Within the Risk"
Moral responsibility contains a fundamental paradox. A responsible
actor cannot exclude consideration of the impact of the act upon other
beings. But what is the impact? On the one hand a reflecting actor must
be responsible for all the consequences of their behavior, regardless of
whether they are actually foreseen, whether they are intended and how
far away they are in time. On the other hand, in practice it is impossible
to foresee all the actual consequences, and the temporal distance also
represents a cognitive barrier. Democritus laid the foundations of
atomic theory but he could not be held responsible for the atomic
bomb. 17 Similarly, the pioneers of the motorcar could not be held
responsible for the damaging effects of acid rain. 1 8 Those
consequences that are seen as being "within the risk" of a certain activity
comprise a selection of all actual consequences a reflecting actor should
include in his or her responsibility.
An ethical approach to risk has (i) to acknowledge that such a
selection takes place, moreover that it is unavoidable, (ii) to investigate
in what respect the standards and rules guiding this selection are a
legitimate issue for moral and political debate, and (iii) to explain
whether the guidelines used in the selection processes are not true or
false (as in theoretical questions), efficient or inefficient (as in technical
questions), but just or unjust, due to the moral nature of the "range" of
a risk.
Jeremy Bentham was aware of the existence of such selections and
he does not seem to have thought the issue could be surmounted by
simple conventions. 19 In his book he reduces the range of the relevant
17 E. Russo & D. Cove, Genetic Engineering) Dreams and Nightmares 203
(1995).
18 See G.S. Wetstone, A History of the Acid Rain Issue, Science for Public Policy
(1987).
19 Jeremy Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation ch. VHI-VIII (1948).
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consequences to those that are "material." 2 0 But he gives no easy
answer to the question: which part of the real consequences belong to
the material? However, he suggests that a special perspective is needed
to be able to distinguish between those which can be said to be as
material and those which cannot: "such only, by one who views them in
the capacity of a legislator, can be said to be material."2 1 The legislator
perspective is in Bentham's thinking, a point of view where the decisions
are guided by the same first principles as in moral decisions.22 It needs
to be an impartial and benevolent view. This is a view in which
everybody counts as one, nobody as more than one, and in which the
promotion of happiness of all those involved is the aim. The decisions
about the range of possible consequences being "within the risk" should,
therefore, be a moral issue, open to moral deliberation case by case. As
can be learned from Bentham, the decisions in each case, whether a type
of consequence lies "within the risk" or not, should be guided by the
very first moral principles we have.2 3 However, I do not think that the
principle of utility can be the one and only principle that we should
apply to in addressing these questions. The selection of the principles or
of the moral approaches we decide to use should be the subject of an
open discourse. In a pluralistic society, generally binding normative
decisions can only be established in ongoing, open deliberations, or as a
necessary prerequisite for ongoing, open deliberations.2 4 I would like
to include in the discourse the selection of "moral standpoints" or
"ethical theories." A practical discourse must be particularly open
enough to challenge the rationality of the "generalized other" and to
introduce the rationality of the "concrete other" in its own right.25
Hart and Honord have shown for the causal relation that the
standards and rules guiding the selection of the consequences "within
the risk" reflect, among other elements, social definitions of
20 See id. ("Of the consequences of any act, the multitude and variety must needs




24 J. Habermas, Drei Normative Modelle der Demokratie, Die Einbeziehung des
Anderen 277-92 (1996).
25 See Seyla Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other, Situating the Self
(1992). (In this point I am convinced by Benhabib's interpretation of the significance
of the Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy in moral theory).
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normality:26 Which situations are normally to be expected? 'What is an
appropriate range of situations in which effects of the action should be
considered? The standards and rules include accepted theories of the
effects that must be examined in this variety of situations.
To make this issue more transparent in actual cases of risk
assessment, I propose to distinguish between three levels:
(i) Consider the following hypothetical. A is building a new garage
on her land and is planning a blasting operation to remove some parts
of a rock.2 7 A considers herself to be liable for damages on persons
and buildings in her neighborhood that could be caused by flung debris
or by the shock wave. She feels herself accountable for such possible
damages in a juridical and a moral sense, because blasting operations
generally are considered to include a risk by flung debris or shock
waves. There is a socially constructed norm, continually confirmed,
which suggests that it is plausible to demand the accounting of effects
caused by flung debris and by shock waves to those persons responsible
for blasting operations. Such consequences ought to be foreseen, even if
A, in fact, did not foresee them. This norm, which I call a "norm of
accounting," prescribes that consequences, which belong typically to
blasting operations (or any other sort of action), ought to be foreseen. A
given norm of accounting is presumably precise enough to be used but
it does not cover all eventualities.
(ii) Consider a neighbor B, who after the blasting complains about
an arrythmia of the heart and brings it in relation to the blasting
operation. A will only be held responsible for the arrythmia of her
neighbor, if it was in fact "caused" by the blasting (i.e. if the blasting
was one of the necessary conditions and was considerably unique). If B's
physicians say he would have experienced the arrythmia following the
next loud sound anyway, the "causal" relation to the blasting would be
questionable. Nevertheless, if A knew of B's sensitivity to loud sounds,
A would have acted negligently at least in a moral sense, by not alerting
B before the blasting occurred. A uses a theory of effectiveness of her
doing. This is not a scientific theory but an empiric "everyday" theory
with certain scientific elements. The theories of effectiveness say what
26 See Hart & Honord, supra note 6.
27 Hart & Honor6, supra note 6, at 286 (a somewhat similar example is discussed).
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effects can take place in principle when a given action is done within the
given actual and concrete circumstances. Theories of effectiveness
enable the actors to exclude a whole infinite range of nonmaterial
consequences from the responsibility. For example, it seems
unnecessary to include the possibility that neighbors always have a light
chance of becoming sensitive to loud sounds in the very next minute, so
that the bang of the explosion would actually harm them. If we had to
include such (and similar) possibilities in our moral deliberations,
blasting operations (and so nearly every other sort of activity) could
nearly never be morally responsible. The exclusion of consequences
from the range of morally relevant effects seems just as necessary to
allow a responsible behavior, as the inclusion of possible effects. On the
other hand, theories of effectiveness urge us to be more attentive to the
real circumstances and the possible developments in the situation.
(iii) Some of the future developments are regarded as normal and
others as totally unexpected. If the blasting accidentally opens a source
of natural gas and thereby causes a big fire, A will probably not be held
responsible for the harms which are caused by that fire. However if the
blasting by accident causes a passing gas tanker to fall over and to
explode, A will probably be additionally held responsible for the harms
which are caused by that explosion. The reason will be that the passing
of gas tankers is a normal event, and the occurance of which at the time
of the blast could and should be prevented, whereas the discovery of
natural gas sources is mostly unpreventable. In moral deliberations
definitions of normality are used.
Together, norms of accounting, theories of effectiveness and
definitions of normality help to determine what we see in a situation as
"within the risk" of certain actions. Just like all elements of a given
morality, these norms, theories and definitions can either be used
unquestioned or they can be the object of rising dissent.
In the above discussed example (A) one parent might think only of
accidents caused by a storm. His definition of normality drives him in
this direction. Dangerous situations can emerge when the boat is
overturned by a storm or by high waves or when someone falls into the
water due to carelessness. Because the weather is sunny, the wind light
and the kids are at least old enough to be careful, he perceives no
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urgency for putting on life jackets that could outweigh the trouble it
would cause. The other parent might use a different definition of
normality, believing that motorboats on the lake can cause collisions
and that dangerous situations can emerge even if the weather and the
wind are benign and the kids are careful. For that reason she might urge
the kids to put on their life jackets. The issue between the two parents
in this example would neither be a difference in assessing the relative
weight of the advantages and disadvantages nor a difference in the idea
of acceptable risk. Rather, the issue is a difference in the variety of
situations where it seems apt to consider the effects of the action.
A considerable part of the present political debate on the
acceptability of technico-environmental risks is not a dissent on
acceptability limits of smaller probabilities and negativities, but rather a
dissent on the justice or reasonableness of some of these elements used
to determine the "range" of the risk. The conflict between defenders
and opponents of nuclear power and of the storage and transport of
radioactive waste (example B) can be interpreted as dissent over the
reliability of that narrow selection of possible situations the defenders
use to legitimize the activities concerned. A very reasonable objection to
this moral legitimacy is that the situations that will occur in the next
hundreds or even thousands of years cannot be anticipated and
therefore a risk assessment using any selection of situations can never
legitimize the production, transport or storage of nuclear waste.
Reality and Modeling
The economic model suggests that the outcomes can somehow be
weighted and quantitatively or semi-quantitatively compared at the
theoretical level. The actual activity is modeled as a choice between
different ways to proceed, each having diverse potential effects which
can be measured by assigning to them a negativity and a probability
value. The moral point of view must be introduced at the level of this
evaluation and comparison, i.e. at the level of the generalized model.
This leads to a series of important moral questions. For instance, there
are morally unacceptable comparisons. If, for example, someone counts
only his or her own profit and reduces the possible harms to those
affected (illness, death and reduction of life chances) to monetary
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values. In this approach, the values that enter the calculation have to
follow a generally acceptable account of values. In my view, however, an
ethical approach should do more. The most important task for an
ethical analysis is the perception of the situation including its context.
We must know what the action under consideration will change. The
action takes place in actual, concrete situations, in a distinct place, at a
distinct time, involving distinct, actual persons and other beings in
nature. Each situation is fundamentally unique. A description of the
action and the situational context cannot avoid the use of general terms.
Thereby, such a description interprets each situation in a certain way
and makes a case comparable in some respects with other cases.
Therefore, each comparison with other situations must be handled as an
essay in interpretation of the actual situation. To communicate, we have
to draw comparisons.
The ascription of probability values, for example, is in my
interpretation nothing but such an essay in comparison. A probability
value results from a tentative comparison of the actual situation with
others in the past. It is unclear what other, more substantial meaning a
probability value can have in a situation which is unique. An accident
like Chernobyl should definitely not take place a second time and has
never occurred before. So, there can be no serious probability
assessment for "Chernobyl-like disasters." Moreover, a probability of
p, even if it is small, gives no guarantee that this rare event will not
happen tomorrow. Probabilities are mathematically defined as averages
that can be approximated over a large number of trials.
To see the difference between model and reality is also important
for the following reason: The safety of a nuclear power plant is not
established by lowering the calculated probability but by working on
the real circumstances such as better security measures, better
containment, better training of the staff, reducing the number and size
of the power plants, etc. And the reduction of probability is only an
indicator of a change in the real state of affairs. Ethical analysis has to
start in the real situation and not in a model such as the decision tree.
This is also important for participative risk politics. Public
participation and effective risk communication can only start in the real
complexities of a unique case.2 8 An ethical concept of risk should help
28 See Christoph Rehmann-Sutter & A. Vatter, Risk Communication and the
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in the perception of the actual case. The model has to be taken as a
heuristic aid and not as a reduced and simplified picture of the
situation in which the solution becomes calculable. The moral solution
of practical problems must be rooted in the real situation, and not in a
picture described in general terms. Morality should be concrete. The
main task of moral philosophy could therefore be defined, to use a
phrase of Whitehead, "as the critique of abstractions."29
Consequences
To evaluate the relevance of this from an ethical approach I
highlight five main points:
1. The moral significance of an action that imposes risk on other
persons is not about observing or transgressing a certain limit of risk, an
"acceptability limit", so to speak. Rather it is the bringing of other
persons into a changed situation, where there an evil component is
introduced; a danger of a certain quality. If we impose risks on others
we involve them in situations we create. Imposing risk is not a separate
or novel form of acting as could be suggested by the idea that risk is
not an actual harm but only the "chancing of a harm."30 It is a sort of
direct action towards others who are affected by a direct consequence.
This direct consequence is a situation in which others are exposed to a
certain danger. Imposing a risk is not an introduction and acceptance of
some probability of bad outcomes but a direct change for the worse of
the situation, the socially co-constructed environment in which other
people have to live. Here, the language matters. 3 1
Ethos of Democracy, Coping with Deliberate Release - The Limits of Risk
Assessment (Ad. van Dommelen, ed. 1996); See also Demokraische Riskopolitik.
Vorschlag ffir ein Mediationverfahren im Kanton Basel-Landsschaft (Christoph
Rehmmann-Sutter, ed. 1996); A. Vetter, Christoph Rehmann-Sutter & Hj. Seiler,
Partizipative Riskiopolitic (forthcoming).
29 A.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modem World (1925) (see ch. 4 with respect
to theoretical philosophy).
30 N. Rescher, Risk. A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk Evaluation
and Management 5 (1983) (Rescher's definition of risk:"Risk is the chancing of
negativity-of some loss or harm.")
31 Sometimes, situations described with the term risk are actual and certain
destructions. The extinction of global biodiversity, for example, is not a risk but an
actual catastrophe taking place before our eyes. The word risk can even have a playing-
down effect and can be misused to hide what is going on in reality.
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2. The establishment and the distribution of technico-ecological risk
is, therefore, a matter of justice or injustice. An imposition of risks can
be unjust in two ways: First, the imposition of a risk on a person or on a
group in a certain situation can be an infringement of a legitimate moral
claim. Second, the distribution of risks between persons and groups can
be an infringement of a legitimate moral claim to be considered
equally.32 The latter can be understood as a question of distribution of
the risks in itself and/or of distribution of risks relative to the
distribution of the advantages.
3. The ethical perspective on this type of activity is opened when
those others who are involved in the risk situations are not only abstracts
like bearers of value, but instead are persons who are to be respected in
their personal needs and their moral autonomy.33
The perception of the real persons affected can lead to active
engagement in favor of those affected. Ecofeminist Carolyn Merchant
states that for women engaged in the struggle to preserve nature,
"Women become activists in part because their bodies, or the bodies of
those with whom they have a caring relationship, are threatened by
toxic or radioactive substances or when land or another species about
which they care deeply is threatened with extinction." 34 I think that
this is true for all humans (both women and men) involved in caring
relationships or prepared to get involved in such a relationship. The
parents in example (A), if they describe their situation in a way
analogous to the risk concept we named "juridical," are taking
precautions because their children, with whom they have a caring
relationship, could be threatened. These parents are not neutral,
detached, calculating observers (like Hare's archangel), 35 but they are
themselves involved in the caring relationship. They are responsible in
the sense of being ready to give a "response" to threats imposed on
others. The "juridical" risk concept can be a better conceptual
framework for ethical questions about the acceptability or responsibility
32 See R.D. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class and Environmental Quality
(1990); Faces of Environmental Racism. Confronting Issues of Global Justice (L.
Westra & P.S. Wenz, eds. 1995).
33 See J. Kellenberger, Relationship Morality (1995).
34 Carolyn Merchant, Earthcare: Women and the Environment xviii (1996).
35 R.M. Hare, Moral Thining. Its levels, Method and Point 3.2 (1981).
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of risk-imposition than the "economic." It connects the issues of risk to
the ethic of care. Example (B) shows that besides the abstract moral
issue of affecting "future generations" with a radioactive burden, there
is a much more concrete issue of being involved in relationships of
caring responsibility with people and children of whose existence we
know, even if we do not know them personally. Conceptually obscuring
these concrete relationships under an abstract pattern of quasi-
mathematical relations in the "economic" risk concept, that cannot
differentiate between "self' and "other," was perhaps as necessary to
give social legitimation to high-risk technologies as is hiding their
dangerous side-products physically in dumps and mines.
The relation which is generated by involving others with those
virtual bonds of humanly-derived and imposed hazard can be
transformed into a moral relationship of personal respect. A concept of
risk, devised from the experience of discussions in jurisprudence, can
perhaps aid in strengthening the social reality of those transformed
moral relationships.
4. The "juridical" is not equivalent with the "ethical" concept of
risk. Because moral questions of responsibility are related to juridical
questions of liability, but not identical to them, an "ethical" concept of
risk can be based on the "juridical" as a basic framework. However, it
will certainly need additional elements, and identifying these elements
must be the object of further studies. One of these additional elements,
in my view, is that the affected persons are not only bearers of rights
but also themselves responsible, political "selfs", in many cases ready to
cooperate in building better lifestyles, as long as they are viewed as
competent partners.
5. From this point of view it seems to me obvious that the affected
persons have another serious moral right, one arising from their being
affected. That is the right to be included in participative democratic
discourse. Moral responsibility in risk societies can only be a joint
responsibility of all those involved, otherwise it fails to be responsibility.
